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In the present study, data from the Labor Force Surveys of Israel’s
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) for the years 1990 and 2000 are used to
examine the occupational segregation in the Israeli labor market based on
the 5 ethnic sub-samples including European-American Jews, Asian-
African Jews, Russian Jews, Native-Born Jews and Non-Jews who mainly
represent the Arab citizens of Israel. The analysis is done separately for men
and women to avoid interaction since men and women demonstrate
different labor market characteristics in general and in Israel. OLS
regression analysis and decomposition techniques are used to differentiate
between the effects of human capital and labor credentials and the other
factors on the socioeconomic gaps between different ethnic and racial
groups. The results indicate that there are significant socioeconomic
differences both among different Jewish groups and between Jewish and
non-Jewish. Moreover the differences among the groups can only partially
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Introduction to Israeli Society, Economy and Labor Force
Israeli society is a multi-ethnic society with considerable social,
economic and cultural gaps between different ethnic groups. The most important
characteristic of Israel is that it is a country of immigrants. Immense Jewish
flows to the land of Palestine started at the end of the 19
th
century with a gradual
expulsion of the indigenous Arab population from the land. Jewish flows have
never been homogenous. Rather, there have been substantial differences among
the immigrant groups including their volume, political inclinations, human
capital resources, and social and cultural traits and characteristics. It is
interesting that the State of Israel emerged historically and politically with an
alleged commitment to justice and democracy and pluralism and egalitarianism
at least for the Jewish population of the world. However, all these concepts have
failed throughout the history of the country within the dynamics ofpolitics and
economics perpetuating the substantial social inequalities among the Israeli
citizens, both Jewish and Non-Jewish.
The present thesis particularly aims to analyze the socio-economic
achievement of European-American, Asian-African, Russian and Native-Born
Israelis and Non-Jews, mainly Israeli Arabs, based on the traditional and
2
contemporary social inequality and labor market stratification theories and the
empirical data drawn from the 1990 and 2000 Labor Force Surveys. In
particular, my goal in this thesis is to examine how individual-level
characteristics influence a person’s socio-economic status given his or her race
and ethnicity. Human capital approach probably falls considerably short to
explain the individual’s socio-economic achievement in Israel due to the unique
nature of the politics, economics and the mechanisms of the labor market(s) in
this country. I will propose that the socio-economic structure in Israel is a
formation of the interaction between the politics and markets including the labor
market. Throughout the rest of the paper, five ethnic groups in the Israeli society
and the labor market will be defined: European American Jews (Western Jews),
Asian African Jews (Middle Eastern Jews), Russian Jews (including also the
Jews from the Former Russian Republics), Native-born Jews (Israeli-born) and
Non-Jewish (mainly the Arab population of Israel). This first chapter will give
an overview for the Israeli society, population, politics and the labor market and
the economy.
Israeli State, Politics and Economy
The Israeli state was founded on Zionist ideology that aimed to attract
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Jewish immigration, create jobs, and build national and economic infrastructure
for the new comers, therefore achieve economic independence, nation building
and dispersal of population geographically (see, for example, Aharoni, 1991;
Bruno, 1993; Metzer, 1998). In doing so, the state has been the major actor and
it has been politically and ideologically motivated, but not particularly
economically focused. The fear of emigration has put pressure on the state to
maintain full-employment even though it has had huge economic costs.
Therefore, Israel has traditionally been a welfare state with socialist ideals for
equality among the differentethnic Jewish populations (see, for example,
Metzer, 1998 for an economic history of Israel). On the other hand, private
entrepreneurs have been sought and extensively protected and subsidized by the
state to contribute to the job creation and nation building procedure (Razin et.al,
1993). In this sense, Razin et.al state the paradoxical reality of Israeli economy
as being both “an Eastern Bloc-type socialist economy, the ‘last bastion’ of
Stalin-typed planned economy” and “modem welfare state with a
flourishing private sector and advanced western type market mechanisms with
extensive openness to world markets” at the same time (1993:2,6). I should note
that the state has been selective in its protection and subsidy to the private
sector; pursued its political interests with its relations with the private capital,
favored certain interest groups over the others and created privileged minority
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within the private sector having political ties with the state itself (see Aharoni,
1991).
The Zionist ideals have always been challenged by the reality. Economic
independence has never come into existence since the country has been
depended on the US economic and military aid since the foundation. The
political legitimacy of the country has stayed problematic especially within the
Middle East. Social equity and ethnic integration have never been achieved.
Different ethnic Jewish groups have socio-economically and culturally stayed
considerably apart from each other. Non-Jewish population has been socially,
economically and politically burdened and oppressed by the structural
inequities.
Israel has gone through significant economic changes since the 19705.
High inflation, high budget deficit, enormous government spending and foreign
debt have been the major problems of the economy for years. First attempts by
the Labor Party in the power to deal with high inflation and the enormous
budget deficit in 1974 were not successful (see Aharoni, 1991, Rugina, 2000). In
1973, the annual change in the CPI (Consumer Price Index) was 20 percent, in
1974 39.7 percent, in 1978 50.6 percent, in 1980 131 percent and in 1984 the
annual change in the CPI was 373.8 percent (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics
figures in Razin et.al, 1993). The stabilization program of 1985 was more
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successful with a temporary use of wage and price regulations in addition to
fiscal and monetary measures of 1974 (Patinkin, 1993).
Although inflation was reduced to 10 percent in 1996, 8.6 percent in
1998 and 1.2 percent in 1999, government spending and foreign debt have
stayed substantially high (CBS, 2001). According to 2001 figures, public sector
expenditure is 54 percent of GDP, one of the highest in the world (Bank of
Israel, 2001). Even with the chronic burden of balance of payments deficit, high
public spending especially in the defense sector, a substantial amount of foreign
debt and increasing unemployment (2 percent in 1979, 6 percent in 1984, 11
percent in 1991, 6.9 percent in 1995 and 8.9 and 8.8 percent in 1999 and 2000
respectively), the Israeli economy has demonstrated significant growth and
productivity increase in information and communication technologies (ICT)
(CBS, 2001).
The development of economy was mainly dependent on the immigrant
waves and boom in demand in construction sector (see Metzer, 1986). Since the
19605, technology intensive sectors have been supported considering the
country’s relatively cheap and highly skilled labor force, and also in search of
alternative growth-leading sectors beside construction (Metzer, 1986 and Regev
1998). In 1995, the real annual percentage change in exports was 3.6, in 1997,
13.5 and in 2000, 30 percent (CBS and Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2001).
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And ICT exports increased by approximately 10 percent between 1990 and
2000. Israel’s trade with the rest of the Middle East (excluding Turkey with
whom Israel has a substantial volume of trade in terms of European Free Trade
Agreement) has been, and is expected to be in the future insignificant in its
volume mainly as a result of the Arab boycott against Israel and political tension
between Israel and the rest of the region (see for example, Razin et.al, 1993;
Kadri and MacMillen, 1998; Israeli Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2001).
On the other hand, Israel is the only country in the world having free
trade agreements with the US, Canada, E.U. and EFTA countries (Aharoni,
1991; Razkin et.al, 1993; and Kadri et.al, 1998). However, the annual
percentage change in employment does not parallel the trend of increasing
production, exports and productivity. Annual percentage change in employment
was 3.8 percent in 1995, and it went down to 1.3 percent in 2000 (CBS and
Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2001). This is not surprising considering the fact
that it is the capital intensive information and communication, and electrical and
electronic sectors that have contributed substantially to the increase in
production and productivity since the 19905. Decline in the percentage change in
employment might also be partially explained by the decline in the labor force
participation rates and partially by the fact that increase in employment in
certain sectors has been accompanied by the contraction of employment in the
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others, therefore leading to only modest increase in employment in general (see
Israeli Ministry of Finance, 1998).
One important subject of discussion regarding the Israeli economy today
is the consequences of high inflation, balance of payments deficit, and foreign
debt in the future. The country has experienced considerable expansion in
finance and business services sector, as cash management rather than production
in physical terms has gained importance in profitability (see Rugina, 2000;
Razin and Sadka, 1993; Aharoni, 1991). For the year 2000, the share of finance
and business services in the business product composition is 33.7 percent, while
the share of industry, transportation and communication; construction and
agriculture are 24.2, 9.5, 8.8 and 2.3 respectively (C.B.S. National Accounts
Department and Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2001). The expansion in the
economic activities in favor of the finance and business sectors has been coupled
with the decline in the share of the manufacturing. The share of the
manufacturing in the labor force declined from 21.3 percent in 1993 to 18.4
percent in 1999 (CBS, 2001).
It would not be possible to understand the structural changes in the labor
market without taking into account the structural changes in economy. The
Israeli economy has gone through structural changes since the 1970 s in coping
with slowed immigration and growth, declining investment, increasing inflation,
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increasing public expenditures financed by foreign debt and increasing
economic and political dependence on the United States (Razin et.al, 1993;
Aharoni, 1991). It can be predicted that the impact of the reduction in
government intervention into the economy and the privatization process that has
been undertaken since the 1980s, together with the globalization of the economy
and changing international trade relations influencing import and export
dynamics, will lead to significant changes in Israeli society and economy in turn
having impact on the labor market since those changes will likely bring
structural changes in sectorial makeup of the economy requiring different human
capital inputs and effecting present wage structures.
Syrquin (1986) notes:
The transformation of the structure of production lies at the heart of the
economic and social changes that characterize economic development.
Associated with a rise in income are changes in the composition ofdemand,
international trade, and factor use. These interact with the pattern of
productivity growth, the availability of natural resources, and government
policies to determine the pace and the nature of industrial growth (Syrquin,
1986:54).
It is also possible to talk about duality in the Israeli economy in terms of
the division between high technology export industries and the technologically
less equipped non-export industries. As a tiny country with a relatively high
percentage of trade, international trade is a strong determining factor within the
structural changes in the Israeli economy. Annual percentage change in exports
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was substantial between 1995 and 2000, and the share of information and
communication technologies has been increasing significantly in the recent
years (Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 2001). Therefore, from an economic
point of view, if the productivity in exports industries increases more than the
rate of productivity growth in non-exports industries, we expect distortions in
internal price and wage structure (Pasinetti, 1981).
At this point, how all those changes will affect the unemployment rates
and inequality issues in Israel in the near future is still a subject of debate. It
may be speculated that the effect of the changes in the economy will be selective
in such a way that certain sectors of the economy will benefit disproportionately
more than the others from the structural changes leading to uneven economic
development throughout the different segments of the economy. Moreover, the
impact of the ethnic compositional change in the society will very likely be
different on the labor force performances of the different ethnic groups changing
the distribution of those groups among different economic sectors and
occupational categories, therefore, changing their relative well-being in different
ways. For instance, there is a disproportionate increase in the Arab
unemployment relative to the Jewish unemployment since the 1980 s
(Wolkinson, 1999). In 1970, the unemployment rates for Jewish and Arab men
were 3.4 percent and 3.2 percent respectively, but they went up to 4.0 and 4.2 by
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1980, 7.8 and 11.2 in 1990 and 5.7 and 8.3 in 1994 respectively (Israeli Central
Bureau of Statistics figures in Wolkinson, 1999). In 1998, the unemployment
rate for the entire civilian labor force is around 8.5 percent while this figure is
around 10 percent for the Arab minority. In 1999, the unemployment rate for the
entire civilian labor force jumped up to 8.9 percent while this figure increased to
11.4 percent for the Arab minority (CBS, 2000). An interesting quote from
Arabic News’ issue of December 23 1997 states:
Last month's statistics showed the unemployment rate has risen to 12
percent and could rise even more in the coming few months with more
and more factories laying off workers and opting for alternative sorts of
operations. Textile factories in Israel have lately opted to open branches
in Jordan where the labor force is cheaper and tax incentives offered by
the Jordanian authorities are more encouraging than those of the Israeli
government.
Israeli Population and Labor Market
As has been mentioned, Israel is a country of immigrants. The first wave
of immigrants arrived in Palestine between 1882-1903 guided and directed by
the leaders of Zionist ideology (Aharoni, 1991). In 1919 the proportion of Jews
to the total population in Palestine was only 10 percent. By 1939, Jews were 30
percent of the total population in Palestine as a consequence of continuing
immigration (Halevi and Klinov-Malul figures in Aharoni, 1991). By 1951, two
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years after the foundation of Israeli state, the proportion of Jews had already
reached 89 percent of the total population in Israel (Aharoni, 1991). In 2001, the
proportion of Jews to the total population was approximately 81 percent (Israeli
Central Bureau of Statistics, 2001). The first Jewish groups who migrated before
the foundation of the state were European Jews. They were accompanied by the
Oriental Jews who immigrated from other Middle Eastern countries and North
Africa right after the foundation of Israel in 1948 (see for example, Raijman and
Semyonov, 1998).
Despite the massive Jewish migration, the proportion of Jewish people in
Israel declined approximately eight percent from the foundation to 2001 due to
the occupation of several other areas in Palestine in 1967 with a Arab population
of one million, and higher fertility rate among the non-Jewish population (or
Arab citizens of Israel; Muslim, Christian and Druze) (Omran and Roudi, 1993;
Ben-Porath, 1986). From 1989 to 2001, 1,086,620 Jewish immigrants arrived in
Israel the majority of whom migrated from Former Soviet Union (FSU)
(Ministry of Immigrant Absorption, 2001). The ethnic fabric in Israel is
considerably complex with the Jewish population having migrated from almost
every comer of the world including Latin America, North America, Europe,
Middle East, Asia, Africa and Oceania together with the Muslim, Christian and
Druze population contributing to the ethnic diversity.
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In Israel, labor market mechanisms are strongly associated with the
population dynamics that are closely linked to immigration. Both natural
increase and immigration has affected the social as well as the political and the
economic dynamics within the country since different ethnic and racial groups
have different demographic characteristics including birth rate, and different
selectivity and numbers in immigration process and have different patterns of
integration to the socio-economic and political context of the country. Social
inequality therefore, which is embedded in political and economic disparities
between not only Arab and Jewish population but also among different Jewish
ethnic groups, has been transmitted through the population processes (see
Goldscheider, 1996). The existence of considerable socio-economic variation
among different ethnic groups is also obvious in the labor market. Israel has a
highly stratified labor market. Some of the variation can easily be explained by
the human capital differentiations among the groups, although it is still
problematic to explain the causes of the variations in human capital differences
among the different ethnic Jewish groups and between Jewish and Non-Jewish,
namely Arabs. Moreover, the remaining variation in the socio-economic
standings of different racial and ethnic groups after controlling for the human
capital differentiations, stays as an issue to be explored through the systematic
political, social, economic and cultural dynamics that maintain and/or
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exacerbate the existing inequality in the labor market outcomes for different
ethnic and racial groups and in the Israeli society in general.
Jewish immigrants have come from different social, political and cultural
backgrounds with diverse labor credentials and different levels of Hebrew
proficiency. They have found their place within the Labor strata that is
dependent on the interplay of various factors that will be discussed later
throughout the analysis. Israeli Arabs on the other hand, have been the most
disadvantaged group among the Israeli citizens not only in the political reign,
but also in the other segments of the life including their social, cultural,
economic and residential segregation from the rest of the Israeli population.
Especially their isolation within the Arab towns and villages with limited
economic and social opportunities, including also their limited access to the
educational institutions have aggravated their disadvantaged precarious position
within the Israeli society and the labor market (see Mazawi, 1999). Disparity
between the Jewish and Arab populations in terms of educational achievement
could be partially attributed to the fact that a significant proportion of educated
Arabs left Israel after the foundation of the Israeli state in 1948; and the Arab
population that stayed in Israel was the ones with fewer socio-economic means
to migrate (Wolkinson, 1999). In 1994, 33.9 percent of Israeli Jews had post-
secondary education while only 12.7 percent of Arabs have the same educational
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degree (Wolkinson, 1999).
Israeli Arabs and the Arab Economy in Israel
Although supposedly the Israeli state is a secular and democratic state,
Israeli Arabs (80 percent are Sunni Muslims) have experienced the disadvantage
of being a minority in a country founded politically, economically and culturally
on Zionist ideology. They have been socially and geographically segregated,
while a number of them are employed in the Arab economy (dominated by the
public sector and only partially by private entrepreneurship where only Arabs
are employed basically due to the geographical segregation of the Arab
communities from the Jewish communities) that is also segregated from the rest
of the Israeli economy (see Semyonov and Levine-Epstein, 1994 and Khalidi,
1998 and Haidar, 1995). I should also note that the present thesis treats the
Israeli economy as one entity ignoring the division between the Arab economy
and the rest of the Israeli economy because the issue is beyond the scope of this
analysis.
Khalidi presents a detailed theoretical and empirical analysis on the Arab
economy in Israel and its evolution throughout time from a
k
‘non-Zionist
political economy” perspective (Khalidi, 1988). In line with Haidar's (1995)
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argument that he Arab economy has not demonstrated any significant
development for years because it has lacked (or been deprived of) the necessary
infrastructure for development, Khalidi (1998) argues that development has not
been achieved in the Arab economy as a result of deliberate policies and actions
of the Zionist regime and “internal colonialism systems” aiming to subordinate
the Arab minority.
On the other hand, the Arab ethnic economy to some extent provides a
shelter for its members by preventing the outside competition supporting the
“ethnic enclave” hypothesis. Semyonov and Levme-Epstein (1994) look at the
ethnic labor market (Arab labor market) outcomes for Arab minority looking at
the performances of Arabs in ethnic labor market in comparison to the
performances of Arabs in the dominant Jewish economy. They found that Arab
labor market in Israel provides a shelter for the Arab minority (for both sexes)
and offers them occupational opportunities and higher returns on theirhuman
capital resources that they would not be able to have and achieve in Jewish labor
market in competition with the Jewish labor force (Semyonov et.al, 1994).
Furthermore, Wolkinson (1999) provides evidence that Arab workers are
excluded and discriminated against in public, private and Histadrut (General
Federation of Labor) firms and facilities. He argues that Arab workers are much
more severely excluded from and discriminated against in Histadrut firms and
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facilities since Histadrut has been prevailed by Zionist ideology aiming to
exclude Arabs from the economic life, society and politics (Wolkinson, 1999).
Discrimination is not only in terms of the disproportionately low wages that
Arab workers are paid relative to their Jewish counterparts, but also in terms of
the inadequate job and promotion opportunities and social and worker rights that
Arabs have, and the limited bargaining power that they can use against
employers (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1993 and Wolkinson, 1999).
Palestinians and the Impact of Intifada on the Israeli Labor Market and
Economy
The present thesis excludes Palestinian workers living in West Bank and
Gaza Strip and commuting to work in Israel on a daily basis, since non-citizen
Palestinians are not included in Israel’s de-jure population from which the labor
force survey sample used in the present analysis are drawn. However, I would
like to briefly mention the non-resident Palestinian work force in Israel since
their share and importance in the labor market are worthy to note. Palestinians
from the Occupied Territories accounted for 6.5 percent of total workforce
employed in Israel in 1986, which is one year before the Palestinian uprising
(Intifada) against Israeli state and its existence in the Palestinian territories (see
Razkin, 1993 and Rosenhek, 2000). After the 1987 Intifada, Israel started to
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impose periodic closure to Palestinian workers as a response to Palestinian
strikes. Therefore, the number of Palestinian workers commuting to work in
Israel has declined significantly. In the period 1995-1996, Palestinian workers
from the Occupied Territories accounted for only 1.6 percent of the total work
force in Israel (Abu Shukr, 1998). Their number is expected to be much smaller
by the year 2000 due to the fierce conflicts between the sides.
Palestinians from the Occupied Territories have alleviated the problem
of labor shortage in Israel in the secondary market jobs in construction sector
and agriculture as cheap and unprotected labor that is easy to exploit. Therefore
theirproportion in those sectors is much more higher than their share within the
entire labor market. Moreover, illegal Palestinian workers are not included in the
official figures noted above. Rosenhek (2000) discusses the increasing number
of non-Palestinian guest workers in Israel as a response to declining number of
Palestinian commuter workers and increasing demand for labor to substitute the
Palestinian work force. Rosenhek (2000) states that there is a trade off for Israel
between the Palestinians work force from the Occupied Territories and the non-
Palestinian guest workers. The former do not threaten security, but are not
desirable in such way that they stay in the country and need to be provided
social benefits including housing, health services and other related social
services, which has not been the case for Palestinian workers commuting daily
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to their work from the territories (Rosenhek, 2000).
There are several points worth mentioning here about the existence
and/or non-existence of the non-resident Palestinians in the Israeli labor market.
First of all, Palestinian workers from the Occupied Territories have been cheap
and vulnerable against any kind of labor exploitation since they lack labor union
protection and any kind of bargaining power for high wages and social rights.
Also, the desperate economic situation in the Territories and lack of enough job
opportunities leave no chance for some Palestinians other than commuting work
in Israel in construction and agriculture jobs that Israelis are not willing to work
in (see for example Rosenhek, 2000; Kadri and MacMillen, 1998).
Therefore, the decline in the number of Palestinian commuters means the
loss of available labor supply that is substantially cheaper than the native labor
in terms of wage (According to Rosenhek’s (2000) figures which is only in
wage terms, Palestinians have provided an approximately 30 percent cheaper
labor source than the native labor). In addition to that, Palestinians have never
had any labor or social rights and any kind of access to social benefits including
life and health insurance, which makes them much more cheaper, vulnerable and
preferable compared to the native labor (see for example, Rosenhek, 2000 and
Kadri et.al, 1998).
Another point that is worthy to mention is that there is an ongoing debate
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on to what extent continuing Jewish immigration might meet the labor shortage
caused by the decline in the number of Palestinian workers in Israel, especially
considering the fact that the majority of the recent immigrants from the Former
Soviet Union have high human capital credentials, and they could prefer to be
unemployed temporarily until they get a job comparable with their human
capital qualifications rather than to be employed in the dead-end jobs previously
filled by the Palestinian labor.
20
CHAPTER 2.
Theories of Occupational Stratification, Immigration and Labor
Market Duality
The present thesis does not include an analysis of wage differences
between different ethnic groups, because there are no data available on wages in
the data sets used for the empirical analysis in this thesis. Therefore,
occupational stratification and inequality in the labor market are limited to the
analyses of socio-economic status (SES) in the previous study. On the other
hand, I am not very concerned with the lack of data on wages, because the
potential factors contributing to wage differences among different groups are
much more of my interest, and they can be partially revealed by studying SES.
Moreover, SES scores might be more informative in a sense that it has
also “social” component which could be much more informative of the standing
of the individual within social context including job prestige, quality of work
conditions, and access to non-wage fringe benefits. Neuman and Silber (1996)
find that the 70 percent of the wage gap between Eastern (Asian and African)
Jews and Western (American, European, South African and Australian) Jews is
“due to occupational segregation, 26 percent to wage discrimination and only 4
percent to human capital differences” (Neuman et al, 1996:648).
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They also provide evidence in their analysis for the existence of sectoral
duality in the Israeli labor market. This means that there are significant
differences between the returns to human capital in terms of occupational
prestige for Western Jews and Eastern Jews, which is a broader concept than
wages per se. The majority of this difference is a consequence of larger number
of Easterners being employed in the secondary sector jobs where there are
smaller returns to human capital compared to the situation in the primary sector
(Neuman et.al, 1996). Metzer (1998) points out that there are external in
addition to internal factors in the Israeli labormarket, which prevents inter-
sectoral capital mobility. Hindered inter-sectoral mobility therefore, does not
allow capital movements from the economic sectors with scare labor to the
economic sectors that are labor abundant and this in turn prevent inter-sectoral
wage convergence (Metzer, 1998).
Furthermore, the economy is both geographically and ethnically
segmented in Israel. Dual labor market theories find substantial support in the
literature providing evidence for the existence of the primary sector with the
jobs mainly occupied by the American and European origin Jews (Western
Jews) and the secondary sector filled by the Asian-African origin Jews (Oriental
Jews). Arabs, on the other hand, are employed at the bottom of the labor market
disproportionately more disadvantaged even than the Sephardim Jews (see
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Haidar, 1995; Khalidi, 1988; Wolkinson, 1999; Lewin-Epstein and Semyonow,
1986, 1993, 1994; and Newman and Silber, 1996).
Duality in the Israeli labor market is not only in terms of the differing
returns to human capital for different ethnic groups. There is also duality of the
economy with a Jewish economy and a very tiny Arab economy dominated by
public sector where only Arabs are employed. However, the majority of the
Arab population is employed outside the Arab economy since there are only
limited job opportunities available in the Arab enclave-type economy (see
Haidar, 1995 and Khalidi, 1988). Existence of the Arab economy separated from
the non-Arab economy is mainly a result of the sharp geographical segregation
between Jewish and Arab communities. Although the Arab economyof Israel is
characterized as a tiny economy with “inadequate occupational opportunities”
and “distorted industrial structure”, I think that it deserves an independent
analysis in many respects, which is basically beyond the scope of this thesis (see
Semyenov and Lewin-Epstein, 1994:51).
Immigration process has an impact on labor market performances of the
different Jewish groups in different ways depending on the Israeli context and
immigrant group characteristics. Empirical analysis supports the idea that, as
time goes on, immigrants do better in the labor market as they become familiar
with both the new country and the labor market (Raijman et.al, 1998, Heberfeld
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et.al, 1998 and Weinberg, 1999). However, it can also be expected that
immigrants’ performances in the labor market are closely influenced by their
labor market inputs or human capital characteristics, the size and demographic
composition of immigrant group, as well as immigration policies that may
change from one period to the other according to the government’s willingness
to engage in immigrants’ incorporation into the society and the economy. In the
case of Israel, different Jewish groups have displayed different human capital
credentials as well as different demographic characteristics in different time
periods. For example, the first massive Russian Jews flow started in 1979 and
continued untill 1983. The second massive Russian Jews flow started in 1989
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the second Jewish
group demonstrated much more qualified immigrant characteristics in terms of
theireducational and occupational status, their integration into the Israeli society
and the labor force was much more burdensome due to several different reasons
such as their relatively larger size and the state’s reduced concern to intervene in
immigrant absorption (see Raijman and Semyonov, 1998). The condition of the
labor market at the time of immigration is also another issue to consider. The
labor market’s ability to absorb the new members of the society is dependent on
the human capital inputs of the immigrants and the space available in the labor
market for those inputs that immigrants offer (see Menahem and Spiro, 1999).
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Therefore, there occurs considerable interaction between the labor market
context and the immigrants’ own characteristics. Metzer (1998) sees
immigrants’ integration into the Israeli labor market as a matter of their
occupational “suitability” and adjustment in the Israeli labor market throughout
time.
Hispanics in the U.S., Algerians, Egyptians and Turks in Europe; and
Palestinians and Asians in the Gulf all stir significant attention in social
research. The issues related to occupational stratification and how immigrants
manage to integrate themselves into the occupational strata are relevant to
international politics, not only international, but also domestic population
mobility during and/or after the immigration, international economics,
international inequality and industrial change around the world. What makes the
Israeli case unique in the world is that the immigration process is much more
politically and ideologically motivated than economically motivated.
Moreover, occupational stratification is beyond immigration; it is beyond
the minorities and/or guest workers with low human capital endowments
working at the lower ends of the labor stratum. In addition to that, occupational
stratification also pertains to the integration process of different ethnic groups
with different human capital inputs, ranging from manual to highly qualified
professional or technical skills, into the politics and economies of host countries.
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The Integration process is also determined by the dynamics of political and
economic implications of inclusive and exclusive policies towards immigration
(see Ugur for a discussion of inclusion vs. exclusion in the European Union,
1995 and Rosenhek for a discussion on the inclusion and exclusion of migrant
workers in Israeli welfare state, 2000). The other side of the coin in Israeli case
is the exclusion of the Arab minority as a part of the integration of the new
Jewish immigrant groups. As a part of the integration process of Jewish
immigrants into the occupational strata, Wolkinson (1999) raises the point that
there is an increasing rate of unemployment among the Arab minority, which is
partially a consequence of the fact that Arab employees are laid off and replaced
with Jewish immigrants. In the year 2000, the unemployment rate for Jews and
Non-Jewish was 8.5 and 11.4 respectively.
Three main theoretical approaches for immigrants’ entrance into a new
labor market can be defined: the succession model, the queuing model, and the
overflow thesis (see Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov, 1986 and Waldinger, 1992).
Succession model suggest that upon their entrance into the host labor market,
immigrants take the jobs at the bottom of the labor market stratum, and push the
other groups up in the occupational hierarchy. Queuing model says that ethnic
groups take their position in the occupational hierarchy according to their
desirability to employers. In the case of whites and non-whites in the U.S.,
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queuing model basically suggests that “if non-whites are low in the hiring
queue, theiraccess to good jobs is greater where the size of the preferred, white
group is smaller” (Waldinger, 1992:99). Succession model and queuing model
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Similar to queuing model, overflow
thesis argues that if a ‘subordinate’ ethnic group grows in size, they lead
reduction in the proportion of the dominant ethnic group at the lower ends of the
labor strata (Lewin-Epstein et.al, 1986). Therefore, immigration, and economic
and occupational restructuring are closely intertwined with each other (Lewin-
Epstein et.al, 1986; Waldinger, 1992; Oberg, 1997). An interaction between
restructuring and immigration is significant especially in urban setting.
The restructuring hypothesis is one of the theoretical approaches used to
understand the contemporary urban restructuring in relation with immigration
(see for example, Waldinger, 1992). Waldinger (1992) argues that empirical
research mainly focuses on immigrants in manufacture and agriculture and
ignores the dynamics between immigrants and transformations in service
industries. Similarly, the restructuring hypothesis proposes that with the
expansion in the service sector, there is an increase for the jobs requiring very
low labor skills namely personal services and for the occupations requiring very
high labor skills namely business and financial services. Immigrants provide
cheap labor source for low-end jobs and help the services grow further.
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Therefore, there occurs a polarization in the urban labor markets as the middle-
level jobs and occupations disappear (Waldinger, 1992).
Menahem, and Menahem and Spiro (1999, 2000) demonstrate empirical
evidence for the restructuring hypothesis from restructuring economy of Tel-
Aviv. Their research suggests that Jewish immigrants are underrepresented in
the high level service sectors and overrepresented in the low level service
sectors mainly the personal services (Menahem and Spiro, 1999 and Menahem,
2000). Menahem et al (1999, 2000) further argue that in line with restructuring
approach, their analysis on Tel-Aviv supports the hypothesis that with the
polarization between high and low level occupations, the middle of the
occupational ladder shrinks making it more difficult for occupational upward
mobility for immigrants reducing upward mobility opportunities (Menahem
et.al, 1999; Menahem, 2000).
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CHAPTER 3.
Description of the Data and Descriptive Overview of the Distribution of The
Labor Force across Economic Sectors and Occupations by Race, Ethnicity
and Gender
A Description of the Israeli Labor Force Surveys
The data used for the analysis is drawn from the Israeli Labor Force
surveys of Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistic (CBS) for the years 1990 and
2000. The Israeli Labor Force surveys are conducted in such a way that four
sub-surveys are done each year, and approximately 11,000 households are
sampled. The survey population includes the entire non-institutionalized
population aged 15 and over. The sampling is done in such a way that the
probability for being included in the final sample is approximately 1 percent (see
CBS, 1990, 2000). Sample data for a small part of the population whose
characteristics do not change over time are drawn from the 1983 census data for
the year 1990 and from the 1995 census data for the year 2000 (CBS, 2000).
The survey population represents the de jure population of Israel that
includes permanent residents of Israel who are Israeli citizens and permanent
Israeli residents without citizenship as well as potential immigrants living in
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Israel or in Jewish settlements in Judea Samaria and Gaza. Also included are the
tourists and temporary residents staying in Israel for more than one year. (Israeli
Central Bureau of Statistics, 2001). Therefore, the temporary guest workers with
permits on contract-based jobs from countries like Romania, Thailand and the
Philippines and workers without permits (which means that they stay in the
country illegally) from numerous countries like Poland, Bulgaria, Ghana,
Bolivia, Chile, Sri Lanka and Turkey (Bartman, 1998), and non-resident
Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip are not included. The absence
of information on the temporary guest workers and the workers without permits
makes the analysis of the sectors and the occupations (mostly the secondary
sector jobs at the bottom of the occupational ladder that those groups of people
occupy, including construction and agriculture) difficult and problematic.
The respondents are asked detailed questions including economic
activity, occupation, status at work, number of work hours, reasons for part-time
job, place of work, reasons for absence from work, reasons for unemployment,
whether the individual ever worked in Israel, etc. The classifications for
economic sector and occupation are adapted by the CBS according to the
International Standard Industrial classification of the United Nations and the
International Labor Office (ILO) considering local conditions (see Menahem
et.al, 1999). Demographic information such as age, sex, marital status, country
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of birth, year of immigration (for Jews only), years of schooling and type of last
school attended is also gathered. There are also questions on household
including the number of persons in the household, the number of rooms in the
dwelling, the number of children in the household and the number of hours of
domestic help. A 100-point Israeli socio-economic scale developed by Lewin-
Epstein, Semyonov and Mendel is used for the analyses. The 100 points SES
scale is compatible with the occupational classification used in the Israeli LFSs
after 1985. The occupational classification used by the Israeli Central Bureau of
Statistics was modified in 1985. Hence occupational classification for the year
1990 and 2000 could not be directly compared as well as the SES scale can not
be directly used for the occupational classification of 1990. Therefore,
occupational classifications for the year 1990 have been modified according to
those of 2000 in order to be compatible with the 2000 occupational classification
and with the 100-point SES scale. After the occupational categories for the year
1990 have been modified and matched for the 100-point SES scale, the two sets
of occupational distribution became comparable in terms of SES scores.
The analyses for 1990 includes the total number of 33,515 people, of
whom 19,735 are men and 13,780 are women (see Table 1). For the year of
2000, a total number of 36,889 men and women are included in the analyses of
whom 20,350 are men and 16,539 are women. The sample are divided into five
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racial and ethnic groups including Non-Jewish (mainly represents the Arab
population of Israel), European/American Jews (represents the immigrants from
Europe, the continent of America, and New Zealand and Australia, excludes the
immigrants from Russia andFormer Soviet Union), Asian/African Jews (the
immigrants from Asia and Africa, excludes the immigrants from the Asian
countries that were previously a part of Soviet Union), Russian Jews (includes
the immigrants from Russia and Former Soviet Union countries) and Native-
Born Israeli Jews (represents the Jewish population bom in Israel). The analysis
includes the men between 25 and 64 and the women between 25 and 59.1
should note that official retirement age in Israel is 65 for men and 60 for women.
The people who were studying at the time of the surveys have been deleted from
the analysis. Men and women have been analyzed separately considering the
fact that women demonstrate different labor market characteristics than men,
and there would be many interactions if they were not separated for the analyses.
Descriptive Overview
Partially, as a consequence of the continuous immigration, Israel has
experienced significant structural changes in the ethnic and occupational make-
up of its labor force. Those changes have been intertwined with the ongoing
structural changes in Israeli economy towards a more post-industrial economic
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system with an increase in finance and business sector activities. Moreover, the
changes in the labor distribution among the various economic sectors and the
occupational groups demonstrate the ongoing structural changes in the society
and the economy. In the long run, those shifts among the economic sectors and
the occupational groups reflect the stability and the change in the society and the
economy. Between 1950 s and 1990, the percentage of employment in various
sectors such as industry, commerce, transportation and personal services
remained stable (Goldscheider, 1996). On the other hand, the share of labor in
certain sectors including agriculture and construction declined substantially,
from 18 percent to 4 percent in agriculture and from 9 percent to 5 percent in
construction (Goldscheider, 1996).
By the way, employment in the finance and business sector, and public
and community services increased significantly between 1955 and 1990
(Goldscheider, 1996). Table 1 demonstrates the distribution of the sample used
in the current analysis by race and ethnicity and gender for 1990 and 2000. The
most striking change between 1990 and 2000 is the changed ethnic composition.
In the year 1990, Non-Jewish constitutes 9.8 percent of the total while the
Russian Jews make up only 6 percent of the total survey population. In the year
2000, the percentage of the Non-Jewish goes up to 13.7 while that of Russian
Jews reaches to 17.1.
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Table 1.
Distribution ofLabor force across gender and race and ethnic groups
(in percentages)
The share of the Israeli-Born Jews stays the same, which is
approximately the half of the population. European American and Asian African











Total (n= 3,287) (n=5,127) (n=7,439) (n=2,053) (n= 15,609)
(%) 9.8 15.3 22.2 6.1 46.6
Gender
Male (n=2,819) (n=2,829) (n=4,609) (n=l,l 10) (n=8,368)
(%) in Male 14.3 14.3 23.4 5.6 42.4
Female (n=468) (n=2,298) (n=2,830) (n=943) (n=7,241)
(%) in Female 3.4 16.7 20.5 6.8 52.5
2000
Total (n= 5,053) (n=3,109) (n=4,599) (n=6,323) (n=17,805)
(%) 13.7 8.4 12.5 17.1 48.3
Gender
Male (n=3,622) (n= 1,571) (n=2,703) (n=3,141) (n=9,313)
(%) in Male 17.8 7.7 13.3 15.4 45.8
Female (n= 1,431) (n=l,538) (n= 1,896) (n=3,182) (n=8,492)
(%) in Female 8.7 9.3 11.5 19.2 51.3
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labor force. The increase in the ratio of Non-Jews is mainly associated with the
higher fertility rates among the Non-Jewish population who are mainly the
Israeli Arabs compared to the Jewish population. The share of Russian
immigrants increased dramatically, almost tripled from 1990 to 2000 mainly as a
consequence of the mass immigration from the Former Soviet Union after the
collapse.
The decline in the share of European/American Jews and Asian Jews can
be associated with the increase of the share of the other ethnic groups, while the
increase in those two ethnic groups stayed at the same level.
Sectoral Distribution of the Labor Force
Table 2 shows the distribution of the ethnic groups among different
economic sectors for the year 1990 and 2000, and men and women separately.
The percentages demonstrated in the tables refer to the percentage of the
employment in that industry for a particular ethnic group not the share of the
particular ethnic group within the industry. Therefore the column totals are equal
to 100 not the row totals. In other words, the tables show the sectoral
composition of the labor force of the each ethnic group. It also demonstrates the
average mean status of each economic sector and the mean status score of the
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each ethnic group in that particular economic sector.
The total number of people represented in those tables is slightly less
than the total number of people included in the rest of the analyses since a very
tiny percent of the people included in the rest of the analyses did not answer the
survey question asking the economic sector that they are in. Therefore, Table 2
represents almost the entire sample used in the rest of the analysis, but not the
entire sample. The sectoral distribution of labor force tables provide substantial
insight on the discrepancies between the ethnic groups in terms of their socio-
economic status in a certain economic sector (based on a 100 points SES scale).
Males in the Sectoral Distribution:
Table 2.1 and 2.2 show the distribution and the mean socio-economic
status of males throughout economic sectors for 1990 and 2000. The total
employment share of agriculture is almost the same for the two years under the
study, 2.9 percent for 1990 and 3.1 percent for 2000. Moreover, the average SES
score for males in agriculture is also approximately the same for the two years,
24.65 for 1990 and 24.73 for 2000. However, the mean SES scores for different
ethnic groups differ for the two years. Although it is not very substantial, the
male Non-Jews in agriculture experience an increase in their SES, while the
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Russian immigrants suffer a dramatic decline of around 45 percent in their
Socio-economic status. The other groups in agriculture more or less maintain
their SES from 1990 to 2000.
One interesting point is that the share of Non-Jewish in the industrial
sectors such as Electricity and Water and Commerce/Hotels/Restaurants
increased from 1990 to 2000 but, their mean SES scores declined, which can be
interpreted as new comers into this industries took the less qualified jobs or
occupations as compared to the previous Non-Jewish population in these
industries. The percentage of European-Americans working in Finance and
Business sector increased by approximately 8 percent from 1990 to 2000, and
their mean SES score remained almost the same. In case of European-
Americans, their distribution among the economic sectors remained more or less
the same except the case of the increase in the Finance and Business sector.
They usually experience no substantial change or increase in the average SES
scores for any particular economic sectors. And in case of the SES decline, they
experienced no more than 3 percent decline from 1990 to 2000.
In 1990, .3 percent of the Russian immigrants are employed in
agriculture. In 2000, 1.4 percent of them are employed in agriculture, and their
mean SES score is more than 14 points less than that of the 1990. In 1990, the
percentage of Russian immigrants working in Finance and Business sector is
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7.7. It went up to 14 percent in 2000, while the mean SES went down by more
than 12 points. By the same token, the percentage of Russian immigrants
working in construction increased from 4.3 percent to 9.5 percent while the
mean SES for construction declined by around 6 points. Generally speaking,
Russian immigrants experienced a decline in their SES in every economic sector
except the personal services (refer Table 2.1 and Table 2.2).
With the exception of the Non-Jews, all the other ethnic groups allocated
more of their labor force in construction sector in 2000 as compared to 1990. in
the commerce/hotels and restaurants sectors, all the ethnic groups spared more
of their labor force for these particular sectors except the European/American
Jews whose share for commerce/hotels and restaurants stayed the same from
1990 to 2000.
Although it is not demonstrated in the tables, I would like to briefly talk
about the ethnic composition of the economic sectors rather than the sectoral
composition of the ethnic group labor forces presented in the Table 2. Since
Israeli-Born Jews outnumber all the other ethnic groups, their percentage in each
economic sector is most of the time larger relative to the other ethnic groups. In
1990, they are the largest group in each economic sector except construction
where Non-Jewish labor force constitutes more than 41 percent of the labor
force in construction while Israel-Born Jews make up the 30 percent of the
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construction labor force. In 2000, Non-Jews constitute around 38 percent of the
labor force in construction while Israeli Jews comprise approximately 32 percent
of the construction labor force. It is important to note that mean SES scores for
Non-Jewish and Israeli-Born Jews in the construction sector diverge
dramatically indicating that these two ethnic groups are involved in different
occupations at different levels of the SES strata in this sector; Israeli Jews take
place at the higher ends of the occupational strata while Non-Jewish are at the
bottom.
In Finance and Business sector, again Israeli Jews are the dominant
group in terms of number. In 1990, 54 percent of this sector is occupied by
Israeli Jews while it is 57 percent in 2000. Non-Jewish and Asian African are
underrepresented in Finance and Business sector relative to the other ethnic
groups in both 1990 and 2000. In 1990, only 7 percent of the Asian-African
Jews are employed in Finance and Business (refer to Table 2.2), while they
comprise 18 percent of the labor force in Finance and Business. In the same
year, only 3.5 percent of Non-Jewish labor force works in Finance and Business
and it makes up only 5 percent of the labor force in Finance and Business. In the
year 2000, 9.5 percent of the Asian-African labor force is employed in the
finance and Business sector, which is approximately 9 percent of the labor force
in this sector. In the same year, 6 percent of the Non-Jewish labor is employed
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in finance and Business, and they make up 7.6 percent of the total labor force
employed in finance and Business.
In both 1990 and 2000, agriculture and construction have the lowest
average SES scores among the economic sectors, while finance and Business,
and Public and Community services have the highest mean SES scores. In both
1990 and 2000, European/American immigrants have the highest mean SES
among the ethnic and racial groups while Non-Jewish, basically the Israeli
Arabs, has the lowest SES. Israeli Jews have the second highest SES, and they
are followed by the Russian immigrants and Asian/African Jews respectively
both in 1990 and 2000.
However, in 2000 the mean SES difference between Russian immigrants
and Asian/African immigrants is very small, that is almost nil. Looking at the
individual economic sectors reveal that the SES ranking of different ethnic and
racial groups with Non-Jewish at the bottom and European/American Jews at
the top and Israeli-Born, Russian and Asian/African in the middle sometimes
shifting their rank in several sectors is most of the time the case for each




































































































































































































































































































































































Females in the Sectoral Distribution
The most distinctive feature of the distribution of the female labor force
across economic sectors is that more than 40 percent of the female labor force is
employed in Public and Community services (refer to Tables 2.3 and 2.4). The
figures for the year 1990 and 2000 are 47.5 and 44.8 respectively. The other
sectors employing more than 10 percent of the female labor force are
Manufacturing, Commerce/Hotels and Restaurants, and Finance and Business.
The sectorial distribution of labor force in each ethnic groups is much more
similar across ethnic groups and across the two years than it is in the case of
male labor force. For each ethnic group, Public and Community services
account for more than 40 percent of the labor force in both 1990 and 2000.
In 1990, Commerce/Hotels and Restaurants sector accounts for
approximately 13 percent the total female labor force. The figure for the year
2000 is 15.3 percent, which is a bit higher than that of 1990. If we look at the
individual ethnic groups, however, in 1990 only 7.7 percent of the Non-Jewish
women are employed in this sector, and in 2000 the percentage of the Non-
Jewish women working in Commerce/Hotels and Restaurants industry is around
20 percent. The share of this sector in the labor force also increased for the other
ethnic group, although the increase is relatively significant only for the Russian
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immigrants (from 13.2 to 18.1) and not very considerable for the other 3 Jewish
ethnic groups.
Although, the share of manufacturing slightly declined from 1990 to
2000, the decline in the share of this sector is greater forcertain ethnic groups
including Non-Jewish and Asian African Jewish immigrants. The share of
Finance and Business sector, on the other hand, increased in both the total
female labor force and in each individual racial and ethnic group. On the other
hand, the ethnic composition of this sector also changed from 1990 to 2000.
Israeli-Born Jews are the dominant group in Finance and Business constituting
more than 60 percent of the labor force working in this sector. Their share
declined slightly from 1990 to 2000. The percentage of European/American and
Asian/African immigrants employed in Finance and Business declined
considerably, although the employment share of finance and business in each
ethnic groups increased slightly. In 1990, 15 and 14.4 percent of the labor force
working in Finance and Business were European/American and Asian/African
immigrants respectively. The share of this sector was 11 percent for the former
and 8.5 for the latter. In 2000, the share of finance and Business increased to
14.1 for European/Americans and to 8.7 for Asian/Africans within the total
employment in those two ethnic groups. However, only 8.7 percent of the
people employed in finance and business was European/American immigrants,
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and only 6.6 percent was Asian/African immigrants.
Theirrelative share within the sector went down mainly because their
total and relative number both within the labor force and across the economic
sectors declined, as it is the case for their male counterparts. It is also



































































































































































































































































































































































no Non-Jewish female employed in Electricity and Water both in 1990 and 2000
indicating that Non-Jewish women have no access to the job opportunities
offered by this sector for certain reasons including the nature of the sector and
Jobs offered. In 1990, Electricity and Water, Finance and Business and Public
and Community services are the economic sectors with the highest average SES
scores. In 2000, the top 3 economic sectors with the highest mean SES scores
are Construction, Finance and Business and Public and Community services. It
is interesting that both in 1990 and 2000, Construction sector has relatively high
mean SES score for the female labor force while it has the lowest average SES
score after Agriculture for the male labor force indicating that women working
in Construction sector are employed at the high ends of the occupational stratum
while men are spread out from the higher ends to the lower ends concentrating at
the lower ends of the occupational strata of this sector. However, there are still
considerable discrepancies among the ethnic groups by gender, and it is
necessary to consider the gender and ethnic-related characteristics of each
individual ethnic and racial group before reaching a conclusion. For example,
Non-Jewish in Construction sector has a lower average SES score than that of
their male counterparts in 1990, while all the other female groups have either
almost the same as or better average SES scores than those of their male
counterparts.
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In 1990, European/American immigrant female have the highest average
SES score in general. They are followed by Israeli-Born Jews, Russian Jew,
Non-Jewish and Asian/African Jews respectively. It is noteworthy that Non-
Jewish women demonstrate relatively a much betterperformance in general in
both 1990 and 2000 compared to their male counterparts while all the other
female groups have lower average SES scores than those of theirmale
counterparts for both years.
So far I have looked at the sectoral distribution of labor force and ethnic
composition of economic sectors by gender. Although, the rest of the analyses
deal with the occupational characteristics of the labor force, I think it is
important to take into account the sectoral distribution of the labor force by
gender and ethnicity. Moreover, the changes in the ethnic and gender
composition of the economic sectors might provide substantial insight about the
social and economic restructuring and are therefore worth considering.
Occupational Distribution of the Labor force
The occupational stratum is divided into 8 sub categories from
Professional (Academic, Scientific and Technical) and Managerial occupations
groups to skilled and unskilled workers categories. Clerical and Sales and
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Services occupations are also categorized as separate occupational groups.
Skilled workers are divided into three occupational categories of ‘skilled
construction workers’, ‘skilled agricultural workers’ and ‘other skilled workers’
considering the nature and the relative importance of agriculture and
construction sectors in the Israeli labor force and economy. The samples include
men aged between 25 and 64 and women aged between 25 and 59. Non-Jewish
labor which takes place at the bottom of the social strata tend to concentrate into
‘skilled workers’ and ‘unskilled workers’ occupational categories while
European/American immigrants and Israeli-Born Jews tend to occupy the
highest ends of the occupational strata as well as social and economic strata.
In 1990, approximately 17 percent of the Non-Jewish labor has
professional or managerial occupational positions. In the same year, more than
40 percent of the European/American Jewish immigrants and more than 35
percent of Russian immigrants and Israel-Born Jews have either professional or
managerial positions. The percentage for Asian/African immigrant group is 21
for that year. Again 1990, around 10 percent of the Non-Jewish labor force is
unskilled labor, while less the 2 percent of the European/American and Native-
Born Jews work as unskilled labor. For Asian/African and Russian Jews the
percentage is less than 4 percent.
In the year 2000, the pictures are notably different than those of 1990
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although the main patterns did not change a lot. Professional and Managerial
occupations constitute around 21 percent of the Non-Jewish labor force in 2000
Considering the figures in 1990, not surprisingly, about 53 percent of the
European/American immigrants have Professional and/or Managerial
occupations. In the same year, approximately 40 percent of Israeli-Born Jews
have those types of occupations. The figure for Asian/African Jews is 22.4
slightly higher than that of the year 1990. The only ethnic group experiencing a
decline in the percentage of Professionals and Managers is Russian immigrants.
In 2000, around 30 percent of the Russian labor has Professional and/or
Managerial occupations 7 percent less than the figure of the year 1990.
In 2000, the total percent of unskilled labor is 8.9 percent notably higher
than the value of 1990, which is 3 percent. Around 15 percent of Non-Jewish
and Russian immigrants and 12 percent of Asian/African immigrants are in
unskilled worker category in the year 2000. Non-Jewish and Russian immigrants
together constitute more than half of the labor force in the unskilled occupations.
The percentages for European/American immigrants and Israel-Born Jews are
4.1 and 4.9 respectively, although higher than their 1990 figures, substantially
less than those for the other ethnic groups. One of the theoretical approaches
getting attention in the literature is “replacement approach” which suggests that
immigrants replace the Palestinian labor force that has become less and less
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available after the 1987 Intifada (Palestinian uprising) in the sectors relying
heavily on Palestinian work force namely agriculture and construction (see for
example Menahem and Spiro, 1999).
Males in the Occupational Strata
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the occupational distribution of the sample by
ethnicity for men aged between 25 and 64 for 1990 and 2000. Similar to the
sectoral distribution tables, they provide information on the occupational make-
up of each ethnic group. The three columns indicate the total number of people
falling into each ethnic group, their percentage share within the total population
and the mean SES scores for each ethnic group. In both 1990 and 2000, Israel-
Born Jews are the most populous group among the five groups, and
European/American immigrants have the highest SES score. In 1990, Russian
immigrants represent only 5.6 percent of the total labor force and they are the
smallest ethnic group within the total labor force. In 2000, as a consequence of
the massive Russian Aliyah (Jewish immigration) starting from 1989, Russian
immigrants became the third largest ethnic group in the Israeli labor force after
the Native-Born Jews and Non-Jews. In 2000, European/American Jews occupy
only 7.7 percent of the labor market, while their share is 14.3 percent in 1990.
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In both 1990 and 2000, Non-Jewish males have the lowest mean SES
score among the five ethnic groups. Their mean SES score remained almost the
same from 1990 to 2000. Although it is slightly higher for the year 2000, the
difference between the mean SES scores for the two years is less than 1 point
(based on 100 points scale). European/American and Israeli-Born Jews
experienced small increases in their average SES scores, while the mean SES
score of Asian/African Jews declined less than 1 point. Russian Jews
experienced the largest change in their mean SES score from 1990 to 2000
among the 5 ethnic groups. Their mean SES score declined by 6 points from
42.94 in 1990 to 36.85 in 2000. SES changes differ across occupations not only
for Russian Jews but also for the other 4 ethnic groups.
In 1990, 13.5 percent of the male Non-Jewish labor force has
professional and managerial occupations. Asian/African immigrant males have
19.7 percent of their labor force in professional and managerial positions. The
share of professional and managerial occupations is 33.1, 34.8 and 43.7 for the
Israeli-Born Jewish, Russian immigrants and European/American immigrants.
Despite their small number both within their ethnic group and within the
professional and managerial occupations (Non-Jewish male occupy only 5.8
percent of the professional occupations and only 2.7 percent of managerial
positions occupied by the total male labor force), Non-Jewish males in this
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category of occupations have a higher SES score than does the population
average. Their average socioeconomic status is higher than all the other ethnic
groups but European/Americans in professional occupations, and higher than all
the other 4 ethnic groups in managerial occupations (see Table 3.1). In the year
2000, the mean SES scores for Non-Jewish males in professional and
managerial occupations are slightly lower than total averages for these two
occupational categories. In the professional category, the average SES score for
Non-Jewish male is lower than all the other ethnic groups except that of the
Asian/African immigrants. In the managerial category, they have the lowest
mean SES score, although their SES score is only slightly lower than that of
Russian immigrants.
The share of the upper part of the occupational strata including
professional and managerial positions increased from 1990 to 2000 as well as
the lowest part of it including unskilled workers. The share of the unskilled labor
in 1990 was 4.1, and increased to 8.3 in 2000. Except the Non-Jewish, all the
other 4 Jewish groups experienced an increase in their share of the unskilled
labor. The share of unskilled workers for the Non-Jewish population declined
around 1.5 percent. While European/American Jewish immigrant group and the
Native-Born Jewish group experienced around 2 to 3 percent increase in their
share of unskilled workers, the increase for the Asian/African and the Russian
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immigrant groups is substantial. In 1990, only 4.4 percent of Asian/Africans and
4.9 percent of Russians were unskilled workers. In the year 2000, 11 percent of
the Asian/Africans and 13 percent of the Russians were unskilled labor. The
share of Russian labor within the unskilled occupational stratum increased from
6.7 percent to 24 percent from 1990 to 2000. On the other hand, despite the fact
that more Asian/Africans as number and as percentage fell into the category of
unskilled workers in 2000 than it is the case in 1990, their relative share within
the unskilled labor force declined from 24.8 percent in 1990 to 17.5 percent in
2000.
As we move down within the occupational strata, it seems that the
discrepancy between the Non-Jewish and the Jewish labor force in terms of
socio-economic status tends to increase. And the relative disadvantage of certain
groups such as Non-Jewish and Asian/African immigrants appears to drive from
the facts that those groups tend to concentrate at the lowerends of the



































































































































































































































































































































































Females in the Occupational Strata
The female labor force is collapsed into 7 occupational categories instead
of 8. Table 3.3 and 3.4 show the distribution of female labor force across
occupational categories. The category for the skilled construction workers is
collapsed into the “other skilled workers” category since there are only a few
female skilled construction workers in both years. The distribution of the female
labor force displays different patterns from that of the male labor force. A higher
percentage of female labor force is in professional positions than is the
percentage of males in these occupations. In 1990, 36 percent of the total
females were in Professional occupations while 20 percent of the males fell into
this category.
In 2000, approximately 32 percent of the females were professionals,
while the ratio of male professionals to the total number of males was 22
percent. On the other hand, in 1994, only 2.4 percent of females were in
managerial positions while 8.7 percent of the males occupied managerial
positions. In 2000, managerial positions accounted for only 4.3 percent of the
female employment, while their share was 10.5 percent for the male labor force.
One general pattern for male and female labor is that the males tend to
concentrate in professional occupations and skilled workers categories, and the
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females tend to concentrate into professional, clerical and sales and services
jobs. Relatively better performance of the Non-Jewish compared to the other
Jewish ethnic groups in professional and managerial occupations, is also the
case for females in these occupational positions. In 1990, there is no Non-Jewish
female in managerial occupations. However, the mean SES score of the Non-
Jewish female in professional positions is interestingly higher than those of the
Jewish female groups, which is similar to the performance of their male
counterparts in the professional occupations in 1990. In 2000, the mean SES of
Non-Jewish female in professional positions is slightly less than the average
SES for the females in this category of occupations and higher than only that of
the Asian/African female Jews. However, with their tiny existence in managerial
occupations, Non-Jewish females have a higher socio-economic status than their
Jewish counterparts except for the European/American Jews who have slightly
higher SES.
One of the interesting changes from 1990 to 2000 in the distribution of
the female ethnic groups across occupations is that the increased relative share
of the Russian immigrants in each occupational category. In 1990, only 6.8
percent of the total female labor force was Russian Jews. In 2000, Russian
immigrants accounted for slightly higher than 19 percent of the total females in
the labor force. In 2000, there was a higher ratio of Russian immigrants in every
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occupational category. In 2000, Russian immigrants tended to concentrate into
sales and services, skilled and unskilled workers categories. Interestingly, Non-
Jewish female have a higher mean SES score then that of their male counterparts
for both years while all the other Jewish female groups have lower mean SES
scores than those of theirmale counterparts. The only exception for this is the



































































































































































































































































































slightly higher mean SES score than their male counterparts in 1990. This might
be directly associated with the different nature of labor force participation for
Non-Jewish female. Religious and cultural characteristics of Non-Jewish
population in Israel are effective in determining the female labor force
participation. However, there are also structural factors that determine the labor
force participation of the female Non-Jewish population. Those structural factors
are associated with the geographical segregation of this minority group within
the country, which in turn led to the economic as well as social segregation of
the group within the general Israeli context. All of these factors limit the
economic opportunities available to the Non-Jewish as they limit all other social
prospects that this minority group can access to. It is expected that these
disadvantages have differential impact on male and female in all aspects of life
including the labor force participation of the two sexes. It is also expected that
the female labor force participation of Non-Jewish have different patterns than
the female labor force participation of Jewish ethnic groups.
From 1990 to 2000, except the European/American Jews, all the other
female groups experienced a decline in their average SES scores. Non-Jewish
female followed by Russian Jews experienced a larger decline in their mean SES
scores compared to the other female groups. It is also noteworthy that the
deviances between the mean SES scores of the five female groups are smaller
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than those of their male counterparts meaning that there is a larger gap between
the lowest mean SES score and the highest mean SES score in the case of males
than in the case of females.
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CHAPTER 4.
Racial, Ethnic and Gender Differentials in Socio-Economic Status
Description of the Analysis and the Variables
The analysis is carried out in multiple steps to decompose the difference
in the mean SES scores between different ethnic groups for the years 1990 and
2000. In the first part of the analysis, the decomposition technique is used for the
year 1990 and 2000 separately. This analysis enables us to see the relative
advantage of one ethnic group over the other in each particular year after
controlling for the basic human capital inputs. In the first step, OLS regression
models are conducted for male and female separately. For each sex, an OLS
regression model is run for each of the 5 ethnic groups separately since
otherwise there will be too many interactions among the variables. This is done
for both years separately. The variables used in the regression models include
Socio-Economic Status score (SES score), age (in years), marital status (dummy
variable- ‘T is assigned if the individual is married), education (a variable for
the years of education is used in addition to 2 dummy-variables for college (two-
year higher school education) and university (four or more years of education).
In the second part, only the Jewish immigrant groups are kept and the
decomposition technique is replicated for those groups in order to see the net
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advantage of one immigrant group to the other after controlling for the year of
immigration in addition to the human capital variables. In this section, three
more variables are added to the models including the years spent in Israel
(calculated as subtracting the year of immigration from 1990 and 2000) and 2
dummy variables for the period of immigration indicating if the immigrant
immigrated to Israel within the first Aliyah period (defined as before 1952), and
if the immigrant immigrated to Israel within the last Aliyah period (defined as
between 1980 and 1990 for the year 1990, and between 1990 and 2000 for the
year 2000).
In the last part, the regression decomposition technique is used across
years by taking the 2000 SES scores for each ethnic group as reference for their
1990 SES scores. Therefore, it is possible to see if a particular ethnic group is
doing better or worse in the year 2000 compared to their performance in the year
1990 in terms of socio-economic achievement. In other words, the last part
enables us to see the net advantage of the year 2000 over the year 1990 for each
ethnic group.
The only variable that could be substantially important for the analysis
but is left aside due to the lack of data is the Hebrew proficiency of the
immigrants, which is likely to be significant in their integration into the
occupational strata. Although, all the Jewish immigrants are given language
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education upon their arrival, their proficiency in Hebrew is substantially diverse
across different ethnic groups, which in turn might be important to adapt their
human capital into the new socio-economic circumstances in a new country
especially for the immigrants in certain occupations that require language skills
The dependent variable in the regression models is SES (Socio-
Economic Status) score measured on a 100-point scale developed in 2000 for
Israeli labor market. More detailed information regarding the measurement of
SES is given in the previous section. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show the means and
standard deviations of the variables used in the OLS regressions and
decompositions.
Table 4.1
Means for Variables for the Male Labor Force aged 25-64 in 1990 and 2000 LF surveys









SES 29.10 49.30 36.92 42.94 43.39
(20.18) (22.50) (19.25) (23.56) (20.76)
Age 39.21 48.59 45.95 43.36 37.42
(9.66) (10.15) (9.10) (10.26) (8.78)
MS 0.86 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.83
(0.35) (0.29) (0.27) (0.26) (0.38)
YofSch 9.05 13.37 10.82 12.77 12.73
(3.87) (3.77) (3.14) (3.65) (3.01)
College 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.17 0.11
(0.23) (0.30) (0.24) (0.37) (0.31)
University 0.08 0.35 0.10 0.31 0.22
(0.27) (0.48) (0.30) (0.46) (0.41)
Yinlsr NA 31.50 32.83 17.65 NA
(13.15) (9.61) (11.17)
FirstWave NA 0.47 0.45 0.10 NA
(0.50) (0.50) (0.30)
LastWave NA 0.08 0.03 0.13 NA
(0.27) (0.16) (0.34)
Sample Size (n=2,819) (n=2,829) (n=4,609) (n=l,l 10) (n=8,368)
2000
Variable
SES 29.83 52.21 36.40 36.85 44.58
(19.38) (23.31) (20.18) (23.65) (21.82)
Age 38.26 48.70 49.74 43.56 39.81
(9.26) (9.59) (8.84) (10.35) (9.50)
MS 0.85 0.86 0.90 0.85 0.78
(0.35) (0.35) (0.30) (0.35) (0.41)
YofSch 11.09 14.81 11.39 13.78 13.31
(3.92) (3.70) (3.73) (3.10) (3.06)
College 0.10 0.17 0.12 0.22 0.14
(0.29) (0.38) (0.32) (0.42) (0.35)
University 0.17 0.47 0.14 0.45 0.27
(0.38) (0.50) (0.34) (0.50) (0.45)
Yinlsr NA 32.49 38.95 11.65 NA
(15.64) (13.16) (9.54)
FirstWave NA 0.25 0.36 0.01 NA
(0.43) (0.48) (0.11)
LastWave NA 0.11 0.06 0.55 NA
(0.30) (0.22) (0.50)
Sample Size (n=3,622) (n= 1,571) (n=2,703) (n=3,141) (n=9,313)
Table 4.2
Means for Variables for the Female Labor Force 25-59 in 1990 and 2000 LF surveys









SES 37.43 45.07 31.61 39.83 43.41
(25.14) (20.37) (18.83) (21.89) (19.60)
Age 34.45 43.74 43.13 41.71 36.64
(8.12) (8.79) (7.73) (8.95) (8.14)
MS 0.49 0.80 0.81 0.88 0.80
(0.50) (0.40) (0.39) (0.32) (0.40)
YofSch 11.49 13.74 10.90 12.89 13.28
(3.54) (3.22) (3.19) (3.21) (2.69)
College 0.24 0.18 0.12 0.24 0.21
(0.43) (0.39) (0.32) (0.43) (0.41)
University 0.12 0.34 0.08 0.28 0.23
(0.32) (0.47) (0.27) (0.45) (0.42)
Yinlsr NA 27.06 31.67 17.71 NA
(12.85) (9.92) (10.03)
FirstWave NA 0.32 0.39 0.08 NA
(0.47) (0.49) (0.27)
LastWave NA 0.11 0.03 0.11 NA
(0.31) (0.16) (0.31)
Sample Size (n=468) (n=2,298) (n=2,830) (n=943) (n=7,241)
2000
Variable
SES 30.94 47.88 31.31 34.13 43.32
(21.12) (19.77) (18.16) (22.87) (18.35)
Age 36.75 45.65 47.14 41.83 38.50
(8.31) (8.68) (7.92) (9.15) (8.83)
MS 0.64 0.76 0.78 0.75 0.77
(0.48) (0.43) (0.42) (0.44) (0.42)
YofSch 12.68 14.83 11.54 14.06 13.70
(3.35) (2.97) (3.38) (2.81) (2.79)
College 0.23 0.20 0.16 0.28 0.19
(0.42) (0.40) (0.37) (0.45) (0.39)
University 0.29 0.49 0.13 0.48 0.32
(0.46) (0.50) (0.33) (0.50) (0.46)
Yinlsr NA 28.69 36.31 11.32 NA
(15.39) (13.82) (9.32)
FirstWave NA 0.16 0.27 0.01 NA
(0.37) (0.44) (0.10)
LastWave NA 0.15 0.08 0.58 NA
(0.36) (0.26) (0.49)
Sample Size (n= 1,431) (n=l,538) (n= 1,896) (n=3,182) (n=8,492)
Table 5.1
OLS estimates of parameters in SES regression models for the Male aged 25-64 for 1990 and 2000
















Age 0.2439 0.1734 0.0997 -0.2940 0.0810
(8.20)** (3.68)** (2.86)** (7.98)** (4.26)**
MS -0.1366 7.7721 1.7712 1.5041 1.9511
(0.18) (5.97)** (1.72) (1.43) (4.48)**
YofSch 1.7335 2.3673 1.6885 2.3713 2.5864
(17.61)** (12.64)** (15.12)** (11.44)** (29.43)**
College 4.8345 4.7935 8.7200 -1.8402 6.2477
(4.90)** (3.36)** (8.20)** (1.53) (11.04)**
University 16.4638 15.7968 21.9240 10.8972 16.9275
(16.50)** (10.30)** OO oo OO ** (7.37)** (27.42)**
Intercept -1.8682 -6.2902 6.6170 11.2235 -0.0851
(1.18) (1.94) (3.07)** (4.13)** (0.07)
R
2
0.3934 0.4390 0.3984 0.2512 0.4406
Age - 0.0015 -0.0486 -0.4129 -
(0.03) (1.06) (11.62)**
MS - 7.8492 1.1585 0.4248 -
(6.07)** (1-13) (0.43)
YofSch - 2.4878 1.5217 2.0816 -
(13.32)** (13.45)** (10.55)**
College - 4.6729 9.1298 1.0763 -
(3.29)** (8.65)** (0.94)
University - 16.0843 23.3637 15.1278 -
(10.57)** (19.97)** (10.58)**
Yinlsr - 0.2199 0.1136 0.5006 -
(3.80)** (2.46)* (8.97)**
FirstWave - -2.7069 -0.1069 -3.9710 -
(1-73) (0.12) (1.06)
LastWave - -1.9616 -5.8886 -6.2503 -
(1.00) (3.20)** (6.67)**
Intercept - -6.1326 12.1547 16.4464 -
(1.79) (4.83)** (6.01)**
R 2 - 0.4520 0.4098 0.3345 -
N (n=3622) (n=1571) (n=2703) (n=3141) (n=9313)
Table 5.1 continues
OLS estimates of parameters in SES regression models for the Male aged 25-64 for 1990 and 2000
















Age 0.3433 0.1662 0.0816 0.2170 0.2944
(10.46)** (5.10)** (3.08)** (4.17)** (14.15)**
MS 2.0492 4.1855 3.0385 4.6285 1.9410
(2.38)* (3.81)** (3.52)** (2.34)* (4.09)**
YofSch 2.1248 2.6973 2.4204 2.9895 2.6276
(20.76)** (20.89)** (23.59)** (12.29)** (30.42)**
College 27.0267 3.8008 7.3700 1.3107 5.3355
(19.65)** (3.18)** (7.00)** (0.76) (8.45)**
University 19.2498 12.6350 14.2649 13.1116 13.8792
(14.92)** (12.26)** (14.15)** (6.57)** (21.85)**
Intercept -8.3650 -3.4703 2.2676 -13.2410 -6.2315
(4.78)** (1.38) (1.24) (3.41)** (5.05)**
R
2
0.4841 0.4319 0.3321 0.4650 0.4166
Age - 0.0470 0.0176 0.0927 -
(1-27) (0.59) (1.76)
MS - 3.7785 2.8491 4.3551 -
(3.46)** (3.31)** (2.28)*
YofSch - 2.7519 2.4384 2.6450 -
(21.41)** (23.79)** (11.08)**
College - 4.1875 7.2228 3.1639 -
(3.53)** (6.86)** (1.87)
University - 13.2749 14.4801 16.5551 -
(12.92)** (14.30)** (8.40)**
Yinlsr - 0.1081 0.0664 0.4514 -
(1.93) (1.52) (4.60)**
FirstWave - 1.6553 1.4462 -5.0201 -
(1.37) (1.95) (1.68)
LastWave - -2.7510 0.8835 -3.3861 -
(1.70) (0.50) (1.57)




- 0.4413 0.3351 0.5041 -
N (n=2819) (n=2829) (n=4609) (n=l 110) (n=8368)
Table 5.2
OLS estimates of parameters in SES regression models for the Female aged 25-59 for 1990 and 2000
















Age -0.2332 0.0358 0.1357 -0.2760 0.0213
(4.11)** (0.75) (3.31)** (7.01)** (1-27)
MS 1.1989 3.3251 3.8959 2.7584 2.0366
(1-23) (3.47)** (5.07)** (3.36)** (5.79)**
YofSch 2.6966 2.8236 2.3810 3.0534 2.7366
(11.72)** (12.92)** (18.59)** (14.43)** (29.58)**
College 2.8550 1.3456 7.6610 -1.1061 4.2408
(1.88) (1.00) (7.42)** (0.94) (8.70)**
University 7.1967 8.1772 12.9533 5.6800 12.1867
(4.06)** (5.45)** (10.63)** (3.85)** (20.96)**
Intercept 1.7939 -2.4808 -8.4931 -1.7144 -1.2094
(0.53) (0.71) (3.37)** (0.60) (0.96)
R
2
0.3088 0.3436 0.4166 0.2266 0.4542
Age - -0.2501 -0.0475 -0.4511 -
- (4.51)** (0.90) (11.95)** -
MS - 2.7246 2.4331 0.7527 -
- (2.92)** (3.16)** (0.98) -
YofSch - 2.7277 2.2002 2.5042 -
- (12.86)** (17.27)** (12.62)** -
College - 1.9533 8.6552 3.2519 -
- (1-49) (8.50)** (2.90)** -
University - 10.0202 14.8151 12.3245 -
- (6.83)** (12.14)** (8.72)** -
Yinlsr - 0.3383 0.0736 0.6086 -
- (6.69)** (1.52) (11.12)** -
FirstWave - -3.5648 -0.5456 -4.3483 -
- (2.37)* (0.56) (1.17) -
LastWave - -1.1634 -9.7120 -6.0946 -
- (0.73) (5.40)** (6.71)** -
Intercept - 2.4620 1.2344 7.1034 -
- (0.68) (0.44) (2.49)* -
R 2 - 0.3845 0.4426 0.3317 -
N (n=1431) (n=1538) (n=1896) (n=3182) (n=8492)
Table 5.2 continues
OLS estimates of parameters in SES regression models for the Female aged 25-59 for 1990 and 2000
















Age 0.1994 0.1031 0.0061 -0.0892 0.1192
(2.41)* (2.79)** (0.17) (1.49) (5.72)**
MS 4.9462 3.4556 0.1873 5.8428 1.6357
(3.56)** (4.37)** (0.28) (3.60)** (3.89)**
YofSch 3.7974 2.8692 2.7931 3.9000 3.6253
(13.03)** (17.72)** (24.59)** (14.56)** (34.86)**
College 19.5347 7.4208 13.3246 3.9025 9.1666
(9.00)** (7.15)** (14.17)** (2.41)* **oopu
University 10.7674 11.5764 11.7097 6.7884 8.0982
(3.79)** (10.03)** (10.09)** (3.39)** (12.00)**
Intercept -21.3789 -6.9311 -1.7988 -14.6916 14.2655
(5.22)** (2.55)* (0.79) (3.28)** (9.67)**
R 2 0.6912 0.4500 0.4565 0.4654 0.4659
Age - -0.0541 -0.0738 -0.1630 -
- (1.29) (1.80) (2.70)** -
MS - 3.0951 0.1202 4.6320 -
- (3.95)** (0.18) (2.93)** -
YofSch - 2.9597 2.8221 3.7773 -
- (18.48)** (24.90)** (14.46)** -
College - 7.0549 12.9822 5.1456 -
- (6.89)** (13.82)** (3.26)** -
University - 12.1782 12.0400 8.9803 -
- (10.67)** (10.37)** (4.58)** -
Yinlsr - 0.2505 0.0665 0.3397 -
- (4.69)** (1.46) (3.61)** -
FirstWave - -1.1755 1.3502 -6.5488 -
- (0.98) (1.65) (2.19) -
LastWave - -0.9754 -3.0967 -6.9441 -
- (0.70) (1.56) (3.19)** -
Intercept - -7.4496 -1.1635 -14.6202 -
- (2.49)* (0.47) (3.18)** -
R 2 - 0.4659 0.4612 0.5018 -
N (n=468) (n=2298) (n=2830) (n=943) (n=7241)
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Regression Decomposition
The regression decomposition method allows us to predict the value of
the dependent variable based on and using the means of the independent
variables (see Sakamoto and Chen, 1992). By this way, it is possible to evaluate
the differential in the SES scores for the different ethnic groups in the Israeli
labor market. Regression decomposition allows us to decompose the difference
between the mean values of SES scores for two different ethnic groups based on
the means of the independent variables and the regression coefficients for two
OLS regressions. I use the term ‘ref’ to refer to the reference group and the term
‘sub’ to refer to the subordinate group.
(1)
The term, S (/?
ret -/?
sub
) refers to the part of the differential between
the SES scores between two ethnic groups due to the differences between the
regression coefficients, and is called rates component. The term Z /?
sub
(X
Xsl*) refers to that part of the differential between the SES scores of two
different ethnic groups due to the differences between the means of the
independent variables of the two ethnic groups, and is called composition
(fcf-füb ) = (aref- a sub) + £ Xsub (/?“-/?“ b ) + £ /9sub Q?e! - X 8
+ £ (J?
et-rb ) (Xfef-Xsub ).
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ref-^sub ) refers to the
part of the difference between the two average SES scores of the two ethnic
groups, which cannot be distributed between the rates component and the
composition component, and is called interaction component. The first
component of the equation (1), intercept component, refers to the part of the
differential between the mean SES scores that is not explained by the regression
models.
For this particular analysis, Israeli-Born Native Jews have been
designated as the reference group since they are expected to enjoy the
opportunities offered by the labor market more than any other ethnic group
including the immigrant Jewish groups and the Non-Jewish who mainly
represent the Arab population of Israel. The differences between the mean SES
scores for all other 4 ethnic groups and the Israeli-Born Jews have been
decomposed using regression decomposition. Table 6 shows the values for the
three different components of the mean SES score differences for males and
females for the year 1990 and 2000 using the Israeli-Born Jews as the reference
category for both sexes.
In the last part of the analysis, only three immigrant groups have been
examined using European American Jews as reference category. Three more
variables have been added to the regression models including the years in Israel,
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and two dummy variables for if the immigrant person migrated during the first
wave of Aliyah (Jewish immigration), which refers to the years before 1952, and
for if the immigrant person migrated during the last wave of Aliyah which refers
to the years between 1980 and 1990 for the year 1990 analyses and to the years
between 1990 and 2000 for the year 2000. The OLS regression results for the
immigrant groups are presented in the Table 5.1 for the male immigrants and
table 5.2 for the female immigrants.
And finally, the differences between the mean SES scores for the year
1990 and 2000 for each ethnic group are decomposed taking the 2000 as the
reference category in order to see the net advantage of the year 2000 over the
year 1990 and what should be the expected mean for each ethnic group for the
year 2000 holding the basic human capital composition constant.
Table 6a. Regression Decomposition of the difference between mean SES scores
(All the 4 ethnic groups vs. The Israel-Born Jews) male labor force
Table 6b. Regression Decomposition of the difference between mean SES scores
(All the 4 ethnic groups vs. The Israel-Born Jews) female labor force
1990 diff. from ref. gr. 2000 diff. From ref gr.
Mean SES for Isreal-Born Jews 43.39 - 44.58 -
Mean SES for Non-Jewish 29.10 14.29 29.83 14.75
Mean SES for Euro-American Jews 49.30 -5.91 52.21 -7.63
Mean SES for Asian-African Jews 36.92 6.47 36.40 8.18
Mean SES for Russian Jews 42.94 0.45 36.85 7.73
1990 diff. from ref. gr. 2000 diff. From ref gr.
Mean SES for Isreal-Born Jews 43.41 - 43.32 -
Mean SES for Non-Jewish 37.43 5.98 30.94 12.38
Mean SES for Euro-American Jews 45.07 -1.66 47.88 -4.56
Mean SES for Asian-African Jews 31.61 11.80 31.31 12.02
Mean SES for Russian Jews 39.83 3.58 34.13 9.19
Decomposition based on the OLS parameter estimates and the means of the independent
variables 1990 Male Labor Force
76
Rates Composition Interaction Net Advantage
Israel-Born vs.
Non-Jewsih:
Age -1.916089 -0.614398 0.087464
MS -0.093189 -0.070864 0.003743
YofSch 4.548028 7.830574 1.852924
College -1.169580 1.384919 -1.111511
University -0.436276 2.586182 -0.721530





Age 6.229052 -1.856745 -1.432046
MS -2.032647 -0.331731 0.177893
YofSch -0.932286 -1.728267 0.044667
College 0.150821 0.026205 0.010582
University 0.438937 -1.733409 -0.170699





Age 9.778596 -0.696538 -1.816016
MS -1.008690 -0.281695 0.101749
YofSch 2.242435 4.616905 0.395198
College -0.128447 0.309724 -0.085496







Age 3.357393 -1.289402 -0.460106
MS -2.484131 -0.453415 0.263274
YofSch -4.623319 -0.130509 0.015800
College 0.670815 -0.080610 -0.247548
University 0.239282 -1.260394 -0.073792
Total -2.839959 -3.214331 -0.502372
Intercept 7.009450 4.169
Decomposition based on the OLS parameter estimates and the means of the independent
variables 2000 Male Labor Force
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Rates Composition Interaction Net-Advantage
Israel-Born vs.
Non-Jewsih:
Age -6.230114 0.377658 -0.252201
MS 1.781016 0.010019 -0.153128
YofSch 9.460328 3.840267 1.889396
College 0.135001 0.219769 0.064243
University 0.078866 1.692029 0.047658





Age -4.497227 -1.541554 0.821196
MS -5.017014 -0.638101 0.477917
YofSch 3.243667 -3.547009 -0.328254
College 0.247159 -0.138865 -0.042129
University 0.536215 -3.181093 -0.227702





Age -0.929225 -0.990811 0.185659
MS 0.161531 -0.209211 -0.021250
YofSch 10.224158 3.244001 1.725203
College -0.288106 0.213190 -0.060442
University -0.682094 2.988887 -0.681167




Age 16.334085 1.102480 -1.406251
MS 0.381477 -0.110974 -0.032974
YofSch 2.964969 -1.131714 -0.102653
College 1.810182 0.152417 -0.669906
University 2.695528 -1.897706 -1.050173
Total 24.186240 -1.885498 -3.261957
Intercept -11.30862 12.88
Decomposition based on the OLS parameter estimates and the means of the independent
variables 1990 Female Labor Force
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Rates Composition Interaction Net Advantage
Israel-Born vs.
Non-Jewsih:
Age -2.762271 0.438242 -0.176242
MS -1.619886 1.524552 -1.020384
YofSch -1.976025 6.826612 -0.309245
College -2.459094 -0.435469 0.231126








Age 0.706447 -0.731565 -0.114640
MS -1.454787 -0.006389 0.003365
YofSch 10.389467 -1.305099 -0.343953
College 0.318322 0.241582 0.056835








Age 4.879612 -0.039362 -0.733666
MS 1.171028 -0.002049 -0.015844
YofSch 9.072440 6.659210 1.984321
College -0.495146 1.276582 -0.398367







Age 8.691683 0.452022 -1.056459
MS -3.702918 -0.482775 0.347620
YofSch -3.540675 1.541259 -0.108555
College 1.289507 -0.11737 -0.158320





Decomposition based on the OLS parameter estimates and the means of the independent
variables 2000 Female Labor Force
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Rates Composition Interaction Net Advantage
Israel-Born vs.
Non-Jewsih:
Age 9.352285 -0.407837 0.445070
MS 0.533886 0.156701 0.109489
YofSch 0.507423 2.753034 0.040858
College 0.312807 -0.095743 -0.046475








Age -0.662356 -0.255979 0.103750
MS -0.976840 0.032884 -0.012743
YofSch -1.291056 -3.198347 0.098591
College 0.585438 -0.013496 -0.029038








Age -5.392778 -1.172116 0.988222
MS -1.442527 -0.030493 0.014553
YofSch 4.105573 5.131819 0.766488
College -0.553803 0.231832 -0.103500







Age 12.435493 0.919140 -0.990038
MS -0.538273 0.061401 -0.016067
YofSch -4.454831 -1.107347 0.114885
College 1.514011 0.100629 -0.486433







Discussion of the Findings
Regression Decompositions for Males
OLS results for the year 1990 show that almost all the variables used in
the simple human capital models are statistically significant except the college
variable for the Russian Jews (refer to Table 5.1). I added three more variables
regarding the year of immigration to the basic models for the three immigrant
groups, European/American, Asian/Africans and Russian Jews. In 1990, none of
these variables are significant for any of the immigrant groups except the years
in Israel variable for the Russian Jews. The coefficient for this variable is
positive and statistically significant for the Russian Jews indicating that as years
in Israel increase, the SES score for this immigrant group increases as well. The
‘first wave’ variable for the Asian/African Jews misses being significant at the 5
percent level with a p-value of 5.1 percent.
The OLS results for the baseline human capital model for the year 2000
is similar to that of the year 2000 except the variable for the marital status is not
significant for three groups including Non-Jewish, Asian/African Jews and
Russian Jews. Also, the variable for the college education is still not significant
for the Russian Jews. The OLS results for the immigrant groups demonstrate
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that some of the immigration variables turn to be significant. In 2000, the
variable for the years spent in Israel is significant for all of the three immigrant
groups and the coefficients are
positive indicating that years spent in Israel is positively associated with
the SES score. The variable ‘first-wave’ referring to if the immigrant
immigrated before the year 1952 (just before and after the foundation of the
Israeli state) is not significant for any of the immigrant groups. On the other
hand, the variable ‘last-wave’, which refers to if the immigrant immigrated to
Israel within the 10-year period before the survey date is significant for the
Asian/African and Russian Jews. The coefficient of the ‘last-wave’ for the
Asian/African Jews is -5.89, and -6.25 for the Russian Jews. Both are
significant at 1 percent level indicating that being immigrated during the last
immigration period decreases the SES score by about 5.89 for the Asian/African
Jews and about 6.25 for the Russian Jews. The last-wave variable is not
significant for the European/American Jews.
The first parts of the Table 6 demonstrate the absolute differences
between the SES score for the Native Jews and those of the other racial and
ethnic groups for male and female. For male, the absolute difference between
the SES scores is substantial between the Native-Born Jews and the Non-Jews,
more than 14 points out of a 100 points scale. Asian/African Jews are the second
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disadvantaged group compared to the Israel-Born Jews. In 1990, the absolute
difference between SES scores of the Russian Jews and Native Jews is almost
nil, less than 1 point. In 2000, the absolute difference between the SES scores of
these two ethnic groups is more than 7 points. The only ethnic group having a
higher SES score than that of the Native Israeli Jews, is the European/American
Jews.
The decomposition techniques reveal the SES differentials after
controlling for the basic human capital variables. The decomposition results in
the Table 6 shows the rates, composition and interaction components of the
differentials as well as the contribution of each variable to those components.
The results for the year 1990 indicates that after controlling for the 5 variable,
the SES difference between the Israeli-Born Jews and the Non-Jews is reduced
to approximately 3 points which is named as the net advantage in the tables.
This is the part of the difference that is not explained by the variables used in the
models. The net advantage of being an Israeli-Born over a Non-Jewish Israeli
increased to 7 points for the year 2000. This means that almost half of the
differential between the SES scores of the Native Jews and Non-Jews for the
year 2000 is not explained by the human capital variables used in the regression
models. The tables demonstrate that major disadvantage of the Non-Jewish
group is their relatively low level of education. In 1990 and 2000, the years of
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schooling variable has the highest contribution to the rates component and the
composition component compared to the other predictors in the models. This
indicates that average years of schooling for the Non-Jewish is lower than the
average years of schooling for the Native Jews. Moreover, the high contribution
of this variable to the rates component tells that the rates of return for the years
of schooling is much higher for the Native-Born Jews than it is for the Non-
Jewish group.
The decomposition results for the European/American Jews versus the
Native-Born Jews is interesting in such a way that although the
European/American immigrant Jews have the highest SES scores for both the
year 1990 and 2000, they are slightly disadvantaged compared to the Israeli-
Jews after controlling for the human capital variables in both years. However,
the disadvantage is very minor, barely more than 1 point in 1990 and less than 1
point in 2000. In 2000, the terms for the contribution of the education variables
to the composition component are all negative. This indicates that
European/Americans have on average more formal education than the Native
Jews. However, the contributions of the education variables to the rates
component are all positive. This demonstrates that the rate of return to formal
education is higher for the Native Jews than that of the European/American
immigrants. Table 5.1 a shows that in 2000, coefficients of the education
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variables for the Native-Jews are higher than the coefficients of the education
variables for the European/American Jews.
The absolute disadvantage of the Asian/African Jews is reduced after
controlling for the human capital variables. Decomposition tables demonstrate
that the net disadvantage of this group versus the Native Jews in terms of SES is
2.3 points in 1990 and 1.8 in 2000. In 1990 ‘Age’ has the largest positive
contribution to the rates component. This drives from the fact that in 1990, age
has a larger rate of return for the Native Jews than it has for the Asian/African
Jews. In the same year, years of schooling has the largest positive contribution
to the composition component, which means that the mean for the years of
schooling for the Israeli-Jews is larger than the mean of years of schooling for
Asian/African Jews. In 2000, the years of schooling variable has the largest
contribution to the rates component and composition component compared to
the other variables in the models. Its contribution to the rates component is
10.22, which is associated with the differential in the rates of return to the years
of schooling for the two ethnic groups. Table 5.1 a shows that in 2000, the
coefficient for the years of schooling variable is 1.69 for the Asian/African Jews
while it is 2.59 for the Russian Jews. The mean for years of schooling is 11.39
for the Asian/Africans and 13.31 for the Native Jews and the difference between
them contribute to the composition component.
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In 1990, the SES score difference between the Russian Jews and the
Israeli-Born native Jews is less than 1 point (refer to Table 6). In 2000, the
absolute difference between these two groups increased to 7.73 points. The
decomposition results demonstrate that the net advantage of the Native Jews
over the Russian Jews controlling for the human capital is higher than the
absolute advantage. In 1990, the net advantage of the Native Jews versus the
Russian Jews in terms of SES is 4.17 (refer to the decomposition table). In 2000,
the net advantage increased to 12.88. Although Russian Jews have more formal
years of schooling and a higher percentage of university graduates, the rate of
return to education for them is less than the rate of return to education for the
Native Jews.
Regression Decompositions for Females
The first part of the Table 6 shows the absolute SES score differences
between the Israeli-Born Jews and the other racial and ethnic groups. Comparing
the differences for the 1990 with those of the year 2000 reveals that Non-Jewish
female and Russian female experienced the largest increases in the gap between
the SES score of Israeli-Born Jews and that of themselves among the all the
ethnic groups. In 1990, Israeli-Born Jewish female have 5.98 points higher SES
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score than theirNon-Jewish counterparts. The difference between the Israeli-
Born Jewish female and Russian female increased around 6 points from 1990 to
2000.
In 2000, the difference between these two female groups went up to
12.38. European/American Jewish female scored a better SES than Israeli-Born
Jewish female both in the year 1990 and 2000 as their male counterparts scored
better SESs than Israeli-Born male in 1990 and 2000. The absolute difference
between Ntive-Bom Jewish female and Asian/African immigrant female stayed
almost the same from 1990 to 2000.
The decomposition results demonstrate the net advantage of being a
Native-Born Jewish female over the other racial and ethnic groups after
controlling for the basic human capital variables. Some results for the females
follow the same patterns of the decomposition results for the males, while some
of them diverge from them. Israeli-Born Jewish female is treated as the
reference category with the same logic that Israeli-Born Jewish male is treated
as the reference category. It is expected that they are the most advantages female
group among the all of the ethnic groups. Although in absolute terms, their SES
score is lower than that of European/American Jews, their net advantage is
expected to be higher.
Decomposition results for Non-Jewish female versus Israeli-Born female
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for the year 1990 is interesting such as way that the negative net advantage for
Israeli-Born Jewish females indicates that the SES score for Non-Jewish females
is higher than it would be expected considering their human capital compared to
that of Israeli-Born Jewish females. This is contrary to what would be expected
considering the disadvantaged position of Non-Jewish minority. However, the
net advantage of Non-Jewish female compared to their Israeli-Born Jewish
counterparts is around 2 points based on a 100-point SES scale, and could be
related to several things.
First of all, in 1990, there are only 468 Non-Jewish female whose
number is much less than the other female groups. These Non-Jewish females
might be much more selective compared to the other female groups considering
the social and cultural traits of Non-Jewish population in Israel. Moreover, the
analysis does not include any information regarding if those women are
employed within the Non-Jewish geography in Israel (with Non-Jewish
geography, I refer to the cities and towns where majority of the population is
Non-Jewish, mainly Arabs). The literature presents enough evidence
demonstrating that ethnic economy provides a shelter and relatively more
opportunities for ethnic groups compared to the opportunities available for them
in the dominant economy. In the year 2000,the net advantage of being an Israeli-
Born Jewish female versus being a Non-Jewish female is approximately 9 points
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in SES score terms. This finding is much more consistent with the expectations.
If we look at the contribution of human capital variable to the composition
component in the decomposition tables, it is clear that in terms of the education
variables, Israeli-Born Jewish female have more formal education than Non-
Jewish females. The positive rates components for the education variables also
indicate that rate of return to education is higher for Israeli-Born females than it
is for Non-Jewish females.
Similar to the decomposition results for males, the decomposition results
for female demonstrate that European/American females have more formal
education than Native-Born Jewish female in 1990 and 2000. However, in 1990,
years of schooling variable has the largest positive contribution to the rates
component indicating that the rate of return to years of schooling is considerably
higher for the Native-Born Jewish female compared to European/American
immigrant females. In 1990, parallel to 1990, the rates of return of college and
university education are higher for Native-Born female than they are for
European/American immigrant females. The advantage of Israeli-Born Jewish
female versus European/American Jewish female is 1.44 in 1990, and it is even
less than 1 point in 2000.
Asian/African Jews are the most disadvantaged female group together
with Non-Jewish female in terms of education. Positive composition
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components for both 1990 and 2000 indicate that Asian/African females have
less formal education as well as the share of Asian/African college and
university graduates is less compared to Israeli-Born Females. Interestingly,
although the values are very small, decomposition results point out that the rates
of return of college and university education are slightly higher for
Asian/African female than they are for Native-Born Jewish female in both 1990
and 2000. The net advantage of Israeli-Born female over Asian/African female
increased slightly from 1.86 to 3.9 form 1990 to 2000.
Russian female Jewish experienced the largest deterioration in their
socio-economic status from 1990 to 2000 relative to Israeli-Born females. The
net advantage of Israeli-Born female versus their Russian counterparts increased
from 3.53 to 12.56 between the two years. In both years, age has the largest
contribution to the rates component relative to the other variables. This drives
from the fact that the rate of return to age to SES score is larger for Native
females than it is for Russian immigrants. Table 5.2 shows the OLS estimates of
parameters for different female groups. The age coefficient for Russian female is
negative in 1990 and 2000 while they are positive for Native-Born females. This
indicates that age is inversely associated with the socioeconomic status of
Russian Jews, while it is positively correlated with the socio-economic status of
Native Jews. Table 4.2 demonstrates the means of variables used in the OLS
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regression models and decompositions. The educational attainment of Russian
female Jews is superior than that of Native-Born females in terms of the average
years of schooling and the percentage of college and university graduates. The
rates components indicate that the rate of return to the years of schooling is
higher for Russian immigrant female as compared to Israeli-Born female in
1990 and 2000. However, the rate of return to college and university degree for
Israeli-Born female is greater relative to their Russian counterparts in both 1990
and 2000.
Regression Decompositions for the Immigrants
Regression decomposition is replicated only for immigrant groups in
order to take the year of immigration into consideration. Three immigration
variables are added to the OLS regression models: “years in Israel”, “first wave:
immigrated before 1952” and “last wave: immigrated within 10 years before the
year of survey”. Table 5 shows the OLS estimates of parameters. Most of the
immigration variables are not statistically significant for both male and female.
Some of the immigration variables which are not statistically significant for
1990 turn to be significant for 2000.
For regression decompositions, European/American immigrants are
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treated as the reference category. Regression decompositions indicate that even
after controlling for the year of immigration, there is still a net advantage of
European/American immigrants versus Asian/African immigrants and Russian
immigrants both for male and female. For males, in 1990, the net advantage of
European/American immigrants versus Asian/African immigrants and Russian
immigrants is around 2 points based on a 100-point scale, which is minor. In
2000, the net advantage of European/American immigrants versus
Asian/African immigrants increased to 3.14, while the net advantage of the
reference group versus Russian immigrants increased to 7.76. For females, in
1990, the net advantage of the reference group versus Asian/African immigrants
is slightly less than 3 points. And the net advantage of the reference group
versus Russian immigrants is less than 1 point, which is almost nil based on a
100-point scale. In 2000, the net advantage of European/American females
versus Asian/African females jumped to 7.42, and it increased to 6,54 versus
Russian immigrants.
Regression Decompositions for 2000 versus 1990
In the last part, regression decomposition is used to look at the net
advantage of the year 2000 versus the year 1990 for each ethnic group. In this
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section, the SES score of each ethnic group for the year 2000 is compared with
the SES score of the same ethnic groups for the year 1990. In other words, the
year 2000 is treated as the reference year versus the year 1990. The basic human
capital models are kept for the OLS regressions and decompositions.
Interestingly, the net advantage of the year 2000 versus the year 1990 is negative
for all 5 racial and ethnic groups for both males and females. This means that the
socio-economic performances of all of the 5 groups in 2000 are worse than their
performances in 1990. This drives mainly from the fact that the rate of return to
years of schooling is less in 2000 than it is in 1990 across all the ethnic groups
and sexes.
Russian immigrants experienced the largest net disadvantage from 1990
to 2000 among the male groups. There is an approximately 10 points net
difference between their SES score for the year 1990 and 2000. In other words,
considering their SES score for the year 1990, they would be expected to score
10 points higher in 2000 given theirhuman capital credentials in 2000. The net
disadvantage of the year of 2000 versus 1990 is 4.25, 3.04 and 2.42 and 1.6 for
Non-Jewish, Asian/African immigrants, European/American immigrants and
Native Jews respectively. On the other hand, it is the Non-Jewish females who
experienced the largest net disadvantage from 1990 to 2000 among the female
groups. According to the decomposition results, Non-Jewish females would be
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expected to score more than 10 points higher in their SES score in the year 2000
controlling for their human capital credentials for the year 1990 and 2000. The
results for Russian Jews are close to those of Non-Jewish. The net disadvantage
of Russian female in 2000 relative to their performance in 1990 is around 10
points. The net disadvantage is 3.17, 1.49 and 2.14 for Asian/African,




The present study has made a very general division among the different
racial and ethnic groups in Israel in addition to the exclusion of non-citizens and
non-residents. Secondly, the Jewish immigrants coming from different and
almost all regions of the world have been divided into three groups:
European/American, Asian/African and Russian although there are substantial
ethnic and cultural differences among each of these three groups. For example,
Jewish population that immigrated from the different Middle Eastern countries
treated in the same group with the immigrants from Ethiopia as Asian/African
Jews. Therefore, further analysis of the different ethnic minorities within each
general subgroup requires further research.
The purpose of this thesis has been to examine the socio-economic
differentials among different ethnic and racial groups in the Israeli labor market
together with the occupational and sectoral segregation of the different ethnic
groups. The absolute differences among the socio-economic status scores for
different racial and ethnic groups are reduced when we control for the human
capital inputs. The unexplained differences (net advantages) between the Israeli-
Born Jewish individuals and the other four subgroups after controlled by the
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human capital inputs remain higher especially for Non-Jewish and Russian
immigrants compared to European/American and Asian/African immigrant
groups. The major disadvantage of Non-Jewish labor is their lack of education
compared to the other groups. In 1990, only 8 percent of Non-Jewish male and
12 percent of Non-Jewish female had university education, while 35 percent of
European/American male 34 percent of European/American female. In 2000, 17
percent of Non-Jewish male as opposed to 47 percent of European/American
male had university degree. In the same year, 29 percent of Non-Jewish female
as opposed to 49 percent of European/American female had university degree.
Social and geographical segregation of Non-Jewish population in Israel
contributes both to the lower levels of education and lower labor market
performances since it inhibits the educational and occupational opportunities
available to the Non-Jewish minority. The social and geographical segregation is
not the case only for the Non-Jewish minority, but also the case for the different
Jewish ethnic groups. One of them is the Jewish immigrant communities from
Asian and African countries. Moreover, the settlement of immigrant groups is
systematically controlled by the state immigration policies. All these factors
contribute to the perpetuation of the geographical segregation and socio-
economic inequality in Israel, which has been only partly captured in this study
since the study has considered only occupational attainment.
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In the case of Russian immigrants, their increased disadvantage is mainly
associated with the substantially increased immigration from Russia and Former
Soviet Union countries. The increased immigration from the Former Soviet
Union after the late 1980 s decreased the chances of getting a job that is
compatible with their human capital credentials for the Russian immigrants.
Raijman and Semyonov (1998) compare the labor market performances of the
Russian immigrants of 1970 s (which was a relatively small wave) with that of
the late 1980 s and 1990 s (which were considerably larger compared to the
previous one) and suggest that the chances for finding high status jobs in the
new labor market are substantially lower for the second and larger immigrant
wave. They therefore suggest that occupational downward mobility is more
pronounced for the later immigrant waves.
The findings of the previous research indicate that there is a drastic
growth of unskilled workers from the year 1990 to 2000. Almost all of the
ethnic groups experienced an increase in their share for the unskilled jobs. The
increase is considerable for the Non-Jewish minority and Russian immigrants.
The percentage of the Russian immigrants working in unskilled jobs increased
dramatically from 1990 to 2000 as well as their relative share within the
unskilled occupational category. The same is also true for the Non-Jewish. It is
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very likely that the absence of Palestinian Labor from the Occupied Territories
which gets more and more pronounced after the 1987 Intifada until the present
time has left vacancies in the unskilled jobs that need to be filled by the next
most disadvantaged groups in the labor market after the Palestinian Labor force,
namely Non-Jewish and the most recent immigrants from the Former Soviet
Union.
The guest workers from different countries around the world including
Thais, Chinese, Africans, East-Europeans, Latinos etc. and their relative position
in the Israeli labor market is also another issue that requires furtherresearch. In
the case of illegal guest workers, the issue gets more complicated with the fact
that those labor force is the most vulnerable labor group even more vulnerable
than the legal guest workers and Non-Jewish Israeli citizens since they do not
have any voice and/or bargaining power against exploitation, inhuman working
conditions, confinement, violence and forced deportation (see for example
Vagner, 2002).
The present study also partially focused upon sectoral and occupational
segregation. It is clear that some groups are overrepresented in certain
occupations and economic sectors while the others are underrepresented. It is
one of the findings of this study that rates of return to education are different for
different ethnic groups contributing to the SES differentials. Neuman et.al
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(1996) focusing on wage differentials instead of SES differentials, show that a
large proportion of the differential among the rate of return to education for
different ethnic groups can be explained by occupational segregation. This
drives from the fact that Western origin Jews tend to be concentrated into the
primary sector while Eastern origin Jews and Non-Jewish tend to be
concentrated into the occupations in the secondary sector.
Furthermore, as I also mentioned before, the study of socio-economic
status only partially captures the socio-economic inequality and should be
complemented with the study of wage/income inequality to fully grasp the
socio-economic inequality and wage discrimination that some of the ethnic
groups suffer. I suggest that the SES inequality, wage inequality and spatial
segregation should be studied together to understand the Israeli labor market
circumstances. Spatial segregation of certain groups especially the Israeli Arabs
restricts their access to occupational opportunities that are open to the other
Jewish groups. Spatial segregation leaves the disadvantageous groups with
limited industrial and occupational opportunities, which in turn paralyze their
socio-economic status and wages (see for example Lewin-Epstein and
Semyonov, 1992 and Neuman and Silber, 1996)
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